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Abstract
Health and safety indicators help mine sites predict the likelihood of an event, advance initiatives 
to control risks, and track progress. Although useful to encourage individuals within the mining 
companies to work together to identify such indicators, executing risk assessments comes with 
challenges. Specifically, varying or inaccurate perceptions of risk, in addition to trust and buy-in of 
a risk management system, contribute to inconsistent levels of participation in risk programs. This 
paper focuses on one trona mine’s experience in the development and implementation of a field-
level risk assessment program to help its organization understand and manage risk to an acceptable 
level. Through a transformational process of ongoing leadership development, support and 
communication, Solvay Green River fostered a culture grounded in risk assessment, safety 
interactions and hazard correction. The application of consistent risk assessment tools was critical 
to create a participatory workforce that not only talks about safety but actively identifies factors 
that contribute to hazards and potential incidents. In this paper, reflecting on the mine’s previous 
process of risk-assessment implementation provides examples of likely barriers that sites may 
encounter when trying to document and manage risks, as well as a variety of mini case examples 
that showcase how the organization worked through these barriers to facilitate the identification of 
leading indicators to ultimately reduce incidents.
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Introduction
Work-related health and safety incidents often account for lost days on the job, contributing 
to organizational/financial and personal/social burdens (Blumenstein et al., 2011; Pinto, 
Nunes and Ribeiro, 2011). Accompanying research demonstrates that risk and ambiguity 
around risk contribute to almost every decision that individuals make throughout the day 
(Golub, 1997; Suijs, 1999). In response, understanding individual attitudes toward risk has 
been linked to predicting health and safety behavior (Dohmen et al., 2011). Although an 
obvious need exists to identify more comprehensive methods to assess and mitigate potential 
hazards, some argue that risk management is not given adequate attention in occupational 
health and safety (Haslam et al., 2016). Additionally, research suggests that a current lack of 
knowledge, skills and motivation are primary barriers to worker participation in mitigating 
workplace risks (Dohmen et al., 2011; Golub, 1997; Haslam et al., 2016; Suijs, 1999). 
Therefore, enhancing knowledge and awareness around risk-based decisions, including 
individuals’ abilities to understand, measure and assign levels of risk to determine an 
appropriate response, is increasingly important in hazardous environments to predict and 
prevent incidents.
This paper focuses on one field-level risk assessment (FLRA) program, including a matrix 
that anyone can use to assess site-wide risks and common barriers to participating in such 
activities. We use a trona mine in Green River, WY, to illustrate that a variety of methods 
may be needed to successfully implement a proactive risk management program. By 
discussing the mine’s tailored FLRA program, this paper contributes to the literature by 
providing (1) common barriers that may prevent proactive risk assessment programs in the 
workplace and (2) case examples in the areas of teamwork, front-line leadership 
development, and tangible and intangible communication efforts to foster a higher level of 
trust and empowerment among the workforce.
Risk assessment practices to reveal leading indicators
Risk assessment is a process used to gather knowledge and information around a specific 
health threat or safety hazard (Smith and Harrison, 2005). Based on the probability of a 
negative incident, risk assessment also includes determining whether or not the level of risk 
is acceptable (Lindhe et al., 2010; International Electrotechnical Commission, 1995; Pinto, 
Nunes and Ribeiro, 2011). Risk assessments can occur quantitatively or qualitatively. 
Research values both types in high-risk occupations to ensure that all possible hazards and 
outcomes have been identified, considered and reduced, if needed (Boyle, 2012; Haas and 
Yorio, 2016; Hallenbeck, 1993; International Council on Mining & Metals (ICMM), 2012; 
World Health Organization (WHO), 2008). Quantitative methods are commonly found 
where the site is trying to reduce a specific health or environmental exposure, such as 
respirable dust or another toxic substance (Van Ryzin, 1980). These methods focus on a 
specific part of an operation or task within a system, rather than the system as a whole 
(Lindhe et al., 2010). Conversely, a qualitative approach is useful for potential or recently 
identified risks to decide where more detailed assessments may be needed and prioritize 
actions (Boyle, 2012; ICMM, 2012; WHO, 2008).
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Although mine management can use risk assessments to inform procedural decisions and 
policy changes, they are more often used by workers to identify, assess and respond to 
worksite risks. A common risk assessment practice is to formulate a matrix that prompts 
workers to identify and consider the likelihood of a hazardous event and the severity of the 
outcome to yield a risk ranking (Pinto, Nunes and Ribeiro, 2011). After completing such a 
matrix and referring to the discretized scales, any organizational member should be able to 
determine and anticipate the risk of a hazard, action or situation, from low to high (Bartram, 
2009; Hokstad et al., 2010; Rosén et al., 2006). The combination of these two “scores” is 
used to determine whether the risk is acceptable, and subsequently, to identify an appropriate 
response. For example, a list of hazards may be developed and evaluated for future 
interventions, depending upon the severity and probability of the hazards. Additionally, risk 
assessments often reveal a prioritization of identified risks that inform where risk-reduction 
actions are more critical (Lindhe et al., 2010), which may result in changes to a policy or 
protocol (Boyle, 2012).
If initiated and completed consistently, risk assessments allow root causes of accidents and 
patterns of risky behavior to emerge — in other words, leading indicators (Markowski, 
Mannan and Bigoszewska, 2009). Leading indicators demonstrate pre-incident trends rather 
than direct measures of performance, unlike lagging indicators such as incident rates, and as 
a result, are useful for worker knowledge and motivation (Juglaret et al., 2011). Recently, 
high-risk industries have allocated more resources to preventative activities — not only to 
prevent injuries but also to avoid the financial costs associated with incidents — which has 
produced encouraging results (Maniati, 2014; Robson et al., 2007). However, research has 
pointed to workers’ general confusion about the interpretation of hazards and assignment of 
probabilities as a hindrance to appropriate risk identification and response (Apeland, Aven 
and Nilsen, 2002; Reason, 2013). In response, better foresight into the barriers of risk 
management is needed to (1) engage workers in risk identification and assessment, and (2) 
develop pragmatic solutions to prevent incidents.
Methods and materials
In December 2015, Haas and Connor, two U.S. National Institute for Occupational Safety 
and Health (NIOSH) researchers, traveled to Solvay Green River’s mine in southwest 
Wyoming. This trona mine produces close to 3 Mt/a of soda ash using a combination of 
longwall and solution mining and borer miners (Fiscor, 2015). A health, safety and risk 
management framework had been introduced in phases during 2009 and 2010 to the mine’s 
workforce of more than 450 to help reduce risks to an acceptable level, and NIOSH wanted 
to understand all aspects of this FLRA program and how it became integrated into everyday 
work processes. We collected an extensive amount of qualitative data, analyzed the material 
and triangulated the results to inform a case study in health and safety system 
implementation (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000; Pattson, 2002; Yin, 2014). The combination of 
expert interviews, existing documentary materials, and observation of onsite activities 
provided a holistic view of both post-hoc and current data points, allowing for various 
contexts to be compared and contrasted to determine consistency and saturation of the data 
(Wrede, 2013).
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Participants
We collected several qualitative data points, including all-day expert interviews and 
discussions with mine-site senior-level management such as the mine manager, health and 
safety manager, and mine foremen/supervisors, some of whom were hourly workers at the 
time of the risk assessment program implementation (Flick, 2009). Additionally, we heard 
presentations from the mine managers and site supervisors, received archived risk 
assessment documents and were able to engage in observations on the surface and in the 
underground mine operation during the visit, where several mineworkers engaged in 
conversations about the FLRA, hazard interactions, and general safety culture on site.
Retrospective data analysis of risk assessment in action
Typically, qualitative analysis and triangulation of case study data use constant comparison 
techniques, sometimes within a grounded theory framework (Corbin and Strauss, 2008; 
Glaser and Strauss, 1967). We employed the constant comparison method within a series of 
iterative coding steps. First, we typed the field notes and interview notes, and scanned the 
various risk assessment example documents received during the visit. Each piece of data was 
coded for keywords and themes through an initial, focused and then constant comparison 
approach (Boyatzis, 1998; Fram, 2013).
Throughout the paper, quotes and examples from employees who participated in the visit are 
shared to better demonstrate their process to establish the FLRA program. To address the 
reliability and validity of our interpretation of the data, the two primary, expert information 
providers during the field visit, Vendetti and Heiser, became coauthors and served as 
member checkers of the data to ensure all information was described in a way that is 
accurate and appropriate for research translation to other mine sites (Kitchener, 2002).
Results
It is important to know that in 2009 Solvay experienced a sharp increase in incidents in its 
more-than-450-employee operation. Although no fatalities occurred, there were three major 
amputations and injury frequencies that were increasing steadily. The root causes of these 
incidents — torn ligaments/tendons/muscles requiring surgical repair or restricted duty; 
lacerations requiring sutures; and fractures (Mine Safety and Health Administration, 2017) 
— showed that inconsistent perceptions of risk and mitigation efforts were occurring on site 
among all types of work positions, from bolters to maintenance workers. These incidents 
caused frustration and disappointment among the workforce.
Intervention implementation, pre- and post-FLRA program
Faced with inconsistencies in worker knowledge of risks and varying levels of risk tolerance, 
management could have taken a punitive, “set an example” response, based on an 
accountability framework. Instead, they began a process in 2009 to bring new tools, methods 
and mindset to safety performance at the site. Specifically, based on previous research and 
experience, such as from 1998, they saw the advantages of creating a common, site-wide set 
of tools and metrics to guide workers in a consistent approach to risk assessment in the field. 
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This involvement trickled down to hourly workers in the form of a typical risk assessment 
matrix (Table 1) described earlier to identify, assess and evaluate risks. Management 
indicated that if everyone had tools, then “It doesn’t matter what you knew or what you 
didn’t, you had tools to assess and manage a situation.” They hypothesized that matrices 
populated by workers would reveal leading indicators to proactively identify and prevent 
incidents that had been occurring on site. Workers were expected to utilize this matrix daily 
to help identify and evaluate risks.
To complete the matrix, workers rate consequences of a risk using the scales/key depicted in 
Table 2. As shown in the color-coded matrix, multiplying the scores for these two areas 
yields a risk ranking of low, moderate, high or critical, thereby providing guidance on what 
energies or hazards to mitigate immediately. Although the matrix approach, specifically, 
may not be new to the industry, the implementation and evaluation of such efforts offer value 
in the form of heightened engagement, leadership and eventually behavior change.
Observing incidents post-implementation of the FLRA intervention during 2009 and front-
line leadership efforts during 2010, much can be learned to understand where and how 
impact occurred on site. Figure 1 shows Green River’s 2009 spike in non-fatal days lost 
(NFDL) incidents with a consistent drop thereafter, providing cursory support of the 
program.
Seeing a drop in incidents provides initial support for the FLRA program that Solvay 
introduced. Knowing that many covariates may account for a drop in incidents, however, 
additional data were garnered from MSHA’s website to account for hours worked. Still, the 
incident rate declined consistently, as shown in Fig. 2.
From a quantitative tracking effort of these lagging indicators, it can be gleaned that the 
implemented program was successful. However, it is important to understand what, how and 
why incidents decreased over time to maintain consistency in implementation and evaluation 
efforts. In response, this paper focuses on the qualitative data that NIOSH collected in hopes 
of sharing how common barriers to risk assessment can be addressed to identify leading 
indicators on site.
Discussion
During the iterative analysis of the data, researchers sorted the initial and ongoing barriers to 
continuous risk assessment. The results provide insight into promising ways to measure and 
document as well as support and manage a risk-based program over several years. After 
common barriers to risk assessment implementation are discussed, mini case examples to 
illustrate how the organization improved and used their FLRA process to identify leading 
indicators follow. Ultimately, these barriers and organizational responses show that an FLRA 
program can help (1) measure direct/indirect precursors to harm and provide opportunities 
for preventative action, (2) allow the discovery of proactive leadership risk reduction 
strategies, and (3) provide warning before an undesired event occurs and develop a database 
of response strategies (Blumenstein et al., 2011; ICMM, 2012).
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Barrier to risk assessment intervention: Varying levels of risk tolerance and 
documentation
An initial challenge, not uncommon in occupational health and safety, was the varying levels 
of risk tolerance possessed by the workforce. Research shows that individuals have varying 
levels of knowledge, awareness and tolerance in their abilities to recognize and perceive 
risks as unacceptable (Brun, 1992; Reason, 2013; Ruan, Liu and Carchon, 2003). Managers 
and workers reflected that assessments of a risk were quite broad, having an impact on the 
organization’s ability to consistently identify and categorize hazards. One employee who 
was an hourly worker at the time of the FLRA implementation said, “It took time to 
establish a sensitivity to potential hazards.” This is not particularly surprising; as individuals 
gain experience, they can become complacent with health and safety risks and, eventually, 
have a lower sense of perceived susceptibility and severity of a negative outcome (Zohar and 
Erev, 2006). As a result, abilities to consistently notice and believe that a hazard poses threat 
to their personal health and safety decreases. The health and safety manager said, “It took a 
long time to get through to people that this isn’t the same as what they do every day. To 
really assess a risk you have to mentally stop what you’re doing and consider something.”
Eventually, management developed an understanding that risk tolerance differed individually 
and generationally onsite, acknowledging that sources of risk are always changing in some 
regard and tend to be more complicated for some employees to see than others. In response, 
discussions about the importance of encouraging conscious efforts of risk management 
became ongoing to support a new level of awareness on site. Additionally, the value of 
documenting risk assessment efforts on an individual and group level became more 
apparent. One area emphasized was encouraging team communication around risk 
assessment if it was warranted. An example of this process and outcome is detailed below to 
help elucidate how Solvay overcame disparate perceptions of risk through teamwork.
Case example: FLRA discussion and documentation in action—An example of 
the FLRA in action as a leading indicator was provided by the maintenance supervisor 
during the visit. This example included an installation of a horizontal support beam. Workers 
collectively completed an FLRA to determine if they could simply remove the gantry system 
without compromising the integrity of the headframe. As part of their FLRA process, 
workers were expected to identify energies/hazards that could exist during this job task. 
Hazards that they recorded for this process for consideration within the matrix as possible 
indicators included:
• Working from heights/falling.
• Striking against/being struck by objects.
• Pinch points.
• Traction and balance.
• Hand placement.
• Caught in/on/between objects.
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An initial risk rank was provided for each of the identified hazards, based on the matrix 
(Tables 1 and 2). Based on the initial risk rank, workers decided which controls to 
implement to minimize the risk to an acceptable level. Examples of controls implemented 
included:
• Review the critical lift plan.
• Conduct a pre-job safety and risk assessment meeting.
• Inspect all personal protective equipment (PPE) fitting and harnesses.
• Understand structural removal sequence.
• Communicate between crane operator and riggers.
• Assure 100 percent of tie-off protocol is followed.
• Watch out for coworkers.
• Participate in housekeeping activities.
Upon determining and implementing controls, a final risk rank was rendered to make a 
decision for the job task: whether or not the headframe could be removed in one section. 
Ultimately, workers decided it could safely be done. However, management emphasized the 
importance of staying true to their FLRA. They said that 50 percent of their hoisting 
capabilities are based on wind and that if the wind is too high, they shut down the task, 
which happened one day during this process. So, although an FLRA was completed and 
provided a documented measurement and direction about what decisions to carry out, the 
idea of staying true to a minute-by-minute risk assessment was important and adhered to for 
this task.
In this sense, the FLRAs served as a communication platform to share a common language 
and ultimately, common proactive behavior. In general, vagueness of data on health and 
safety risks can prevent hazard recognition, impair decision-making, and disrupt risk-based 
decisions among workers (Ruan, Liu and Carchon, 2003). This example showed that the 
more workers understood what constitutes an acceptable level of risk, the greater sense of 
shared responsibility they had to prevent hazards and make protective decisions on the job 
(Reason, 1998) such as shutting down a procedure due to potential problems. Now, workers 
have the ability to implement their own check-and-balance system to determine if a response 
is needed and their decision is supported. Treating the FLRA as a check-and-balance system 
allowed workers to improve their own risk assessment knowledge, skills and motivation, a 
common barrier to hazard identification (Haslam et al., 2016). In theory, as FLRAs are 
increasingly used to predetermine possible incidents and response strategies are developed 
and referenced, the occurrence of lagging indicators should decrease, as has been the case at 
Solvay in recent years.
Barrier to risk assessment intervention: Resisting formal risk assessment methods
Worksites often face challenges of determining the best ways to measure and develop 
suitable tools to facilitate consistent risk measurement (Boyle, 2012; Haas and Yorio, 2016; 
Haas, Willmer and Cecala, 2016). For example, research shows that assessing site risks 
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using a series of checklists or general observations during site walkthroughs is more 
common (Navon and Kolten, 2006). Although practical, checklists and observations require 
little cognitive investment and have more often been insufficient in revealing potential safety 
problems (Jou et al., 2009). Due to familiarity with “the way things were,” implementing the 
system of risk assessments at Solvay came with challenges. Workers experienced initial 
resistance to moving toward something more formal.
For example, at the outset, hourly workers said they felt, “I do this in my head all the time. I 
just don’t write it down.” Particularly, individuals who were hourly workers at the time of 
the FLRA program implementation felt that they already did some form of risk identification 
and that they did not need to go into more detail to assess the risk. Just as some workers did 
not see a difference with what they did implicitly, and so discounted the value of conducting 
an FLRA, others did not think they needed to take action based on their matrix risk ranking. 
As one worker reflected on the previous mindset, he said, “It would be okay to be in the red, 
so long as you knew you were in the red.” Because of the varying levels of initial 
acceptance, there were inconsistencies in the quality of the completed risk assessment 
matrices. Management noted, “Initially, people were doing them, but not to the quality they 
could have been.” In response, Solvay management focused on strengthening their frontline 
leadership skills to help facilitate hourly buy-in, as described in the following case example.
Case example: Starting with frontline leadership to facilitate buy-in, “The 
Club”—To facilitate wider commitment and buy-in, senior-level management took 
additional steps with their frontline supervisors. To train frontline leaders on how to 
understand rather than punish worker actions, Solvay management started a working group 
in 2010 called “The Club.” This group consisted of supervisory personnel within various 
levels of the organization. The purpose of The Club was to develop leaders and a different 
sort of accountability with respect to safety. One of its first actions was to, as a group, agree 
on qualities of a safety leader. From there, they eventually executed a quality leadership 
program that embraced the use of the risk assessment tools and their outcomes (Fiscor, 
2015; Heiser and Vendetti, 2015).
After receiving this leadership training and engaging in discussions about FLRA, the 
execution of model leadership from The Club started. Specifically, the frontline foremen that 
the researchers talked with indicated that they were better able to communicate about and 
manage safety across the site. Prior to The Club and adapting to the FLRA, one of these 
supervisors reflected, “No one wanted to make a safety decision.” Senior management 
acknowledged with their frontline leadership that the FLRA identifies steps that anyone 
might miss because they are interlocked components of a system. Because of the complex 
risks present on site, they discussed the importance of sitting down and reviewing with 
hourly workers if something happened or went wrong. They shared the importance of 
supportive language: “We say ‘let’s not do this again,’ but they don’t get in trouble.”
To further illustrate the leadership style and communicative focus, one manager shared a 
conversation conducted with a worker after an incident. Rather than reprimanding the 
worker’s error in judgement, the manager asked: “What was going through your mind 
before, during this task? I just want to understand you, your choices, your thought process, 
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so we can prevent someone else from doing the same thing, making those same choices.” 
After the worker acknowledged he did not have the right tools but tried to improvise, the 
manager asked him what other risky choices he had made that turned out okay. This process 
engaged the worker, and he “really opened up” about his perceptions and behaviors on site. 
This incident is an example of site leaders establishing accountability for action but ensuring 
that adequate resources and site support were available to facilitate safer practice in the 
future (Yorio and Willmer, 2015; Zohar and Luria, 2005). In other words, management used 
these conversations not only to educate the workers about hazards involved in complex 
systems, but also to enact their positive safety culture.
Importantly, this communication and documentation among The Club allowed insight into 
how employees think, serving as a leading indicator for health and safety management. The 
stack of FLRAs that were pulled out — completed between 2009 and 2015 — were filled 
out with greater detail as the years progressed. It was apparent that the hourly workforce 
continually adapted, resulting in an improved sense of organizational motivation, culture and 
trust. Management indicated to NIOSH that workers now have an increased sense of 
empowerment to identify and mitigate risks. Contrary to how workers used to document 
their risk assessments, a management member said: “You pull one out today, and even if it 
isn’t perfect, the fundamentals are all there, even if it isn’t exactly how we would do it. And 
more likely than not, you’d pull out one and find it to be terrific.”
Barrier to risk assessment intervention: Communicate and show tangible 
support for risk assessment methods—A lack of management commitment, poor 
communication and poor worker involvement have all been identified as features of a safety 
climate that inhibit workers’ willingness to proactively identify risks (Rundmo, 2000; Zohar 
and Luria, 2005). Therefore, promoting these organizational factors was needed to 
encourage workers to identify hazards and prevent incidents (Pinto et al., 2011). When first 
rolling out their FLRA process, Solvay management knew that if they were going to 
transform safety practices at the mine, there had to be open communication between hourly 
and salary workers about site conditions and practices (Fiscor, 2015; Heiser and Vendetti, 
2015; Neal and Griffin, 2006; Reason, 1998; Rundmo, 2000; Wold and Laumann, 2015; 
Zohar and Luria, 2005). They discussed preparing themselves to be “exposed” to such 
information and commit as a group to react in a way that would maintain buy-in, use and 
behavior.
Creating a process of open sharing meant that, especially at the outset, management was 
likely to hear things that they didn’t necessarily want to hear. Despite perhaps not wanting to 
hear feedback against a policy in place or attitude of risk acceptance, all levels of 
management wanted to communicate their understanding for changing risks and hazards, 
and the need to sometimes adapt policies in place based on changing energies in the 
environment, as revealed by the FLRAs that the workers were taking time to complete. The 
following case example showcases the value of ongoing communication to maintain a risk 
assessment program and buy-in from workers.
Case example: Illustrating flexibility with site procedures—During the visit, 
managers and workers both discussed the conscious efforts made during group meetings and 
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one-on-one interactions to improve their organizational leadership and communication, 
noting the difficulty of incorporating the FLRA as a complement to existing rules and 
regulations on site: “We needed to continually stress the importance of utilizing the risk 
assessment tool, and if something were to occur, to evaluate the level of controls 
implemented during a reassessment of the task.” To encourage worker accountability, the 
managers wanted to show their commitment to the FLRA process and that they could be 
flexible in changing a rule or policy if the risk assessment showed a need. As an example, 
they showed NIOSH a “general isolation” procedure about lock-out/tag-out that was 
distributed at their preshift safety meeting that morning. They handed out a piece of paper 
saying that, “While a visual disconnect secured with individual locks is always the preferred 
method of isolation, there are specific isolation procedures for tasks unique to underground 
operations.” The handout went on to state: “In rare circumstances, when a visual disconnect 
with lock is not used and circumstances other than those specifically identified are 
encountered, a formal documented risk assessment will be performed. All potential energies 
will be identified and understood, every practical barrier at the appropriate level will be 
identified and implemented, and the foreman in charge of the task will approve with his/her 
signature prior to performing the work. All personnel involved in the job or task must review 
and understand the energies and barriers implemented prior to any work being performed…”
This example shows the site’s commitment to risk assessment while also showing that, if 
leading indicators are identified, a policy can be changed to avoid a potential incident. 
Noting that they would change a procedure if workers identified something, the document 
illustrated management’s confidence and value in the FLRA process. Workers indicated that 
these behaviors are a support mechanism for them and their hazard identification efforts. 
Along the same lines, the managers we talked with noted the importance of not just training 
to procedure but also to emphasize: “High-level policies complement but don’t drive safety.” 
This example showcases their leadership and communicative commitment.
The lock-out/tag-out example is just one safety share that occurred at a preshift meeting. 
These shares “might be no more than five minutes, they might go a half-hour, but they’re 
allowed to take as long as they need,” one manager said. This continued commitment to 
foster the use of leading indicators to support a health and safety management program has 
shown that the metrics used to assess risks are only as good as the response to those metrics 
to support and encourage health and safety as well as afforded workers an opportunity to 
engage in improving the policies and rules on site. This continued consistency in 
communication helped to create a sense of ownership among workers, which led them to 
recognize the need for a minute-to-minute thought process that helped them foresee 
consequences, probabilities, and deliberate different response options. As one manager said, 
“You can have a defined plan but an actual risk assessment shows the dynamics of a 
situation and allows different plans to emerge.”
Limitations and conclusions
The purpose of this paper was to illustrate an example in which everyone could participate to 
identify leading safety indicators. In everyone’s judgment, it took about four to five years 
until Solvay actually saw the change in action, meaning that the process was sustained by 
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workers and they were using the risk assessment terminology in their everyday discussions. 
In addition to providing how leading indicators can be developed or look “in action,” this 
paper advanced the discussion to provide insight into common barriers to risk assessment, 
and potential responses to these barriers. As Figs. 1 and 2 show, incidents had been down at 
Solvay since the implementation of the FLRA program and enhanced leadership training of 
frontline supervisors, showing the impact of the FLRAs as a strong leading indicator for 
health and safety. Additionally, hourly workers discussed how much better the culture is on 
site now than it was several years ago, noting their appreciation for having a common 
language on site to communicate about risks. It is rare that both sides — hourly and salary 
— see benefits in a written tool from an operational and behavioral standpoint. The 
cooperation on site speaks to the positive attributes discussed within this case study and mini 
examples provided that cannot be shown in a graph.
Although the results of this study are only part of a small case study and cannot be 
generalized across the industry, data support the argument that poor leadership and an 
overall lack of trust on site can inhibit workers’ willingness to participate in risk 
measurement, documentation and decision-making. Obviously, the researchers could not talk 
with every worker and manager present on site, so not all opinions are reflected in this paper. 
However, the consistency in messages from both levels of the organization showed 
saturation of insights that reflect the impact of the FLRAs. It is acknowledged that some of 
this information may already be known and utilized by mine site leadership. However, 
because the focus of the study was not only on the development and use of specific risk 
measurement tools, but the organizational practices that are needed to foster such proactive 
behavior, the results provide several potential areas of improvement for the industry in terms 
of formal risk assessment over a period of time.
In lieu of these limitations, mine operators should consider this information when 
interpreting the results in terms of (1) how to establish formal risk assessment on site, 
especially when trying to identify and mitigate hazards, (2) what the current mindset of 
frontline leadership may be and how they could support (or hinder) such an risk assessment 
program and (3) methods to consistently support a participatory risk assessment program. 
Gaining an in-depth view of Solvay’s own health and safety journey provides expectations 
and a possible roadmap for encouraging worker participation in risk management at other 
mine sites to proactively prevent health and safety incidents.
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Figure 1. 
Solvay non-fatal days lost operator injuries, 2006–2016 (MSHA, 2017).
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Figure 2. 
Non-fatal days lost operator injury incidence rate (injuries by hours worked), 2006–2016 
(MSHA, 2017).
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Table 2
Evaluation matrix key (Heiser and Vendetti, 2015).
Probability Consequence
1. RARE, practically impossible 1. Could cause 1st aid injury/minor damage
2. UNLIKELY, not likely to occur 2. Could cause minor injuries (recordable)
3. MODERATE, possibility to occur 3. Could cause moderate damage (LTA)
4. LIKELY, to happen at some point 4. Could cause permanent disability or fatality
5. ALMOST CERTAIN, to happen 5. Could cause multiple fatalities
Assessment
15 — 25: CRITICAL
9 — 12: HIGH
5 — 8: MODERATE
1 — 4: LO W
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